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1. Introduction and hypotheses 
Probably the first questions that arise when one starts to depict Turkish foreign policy (TFP) 
towards the Balkans are ‘what does Turkey really do in the region and what does it really 
want to achieve?’ which practically means that research may focus on the tools and the object 
of Ankara’s external ambitions. Nevertheless, for the author, to reveal the cause seemed to be 
more relevant because it may provide a deeper understanding of Turkish foreign policy’s 
nature, motives and makes its prediction easier.  
Re-emergence as a powerful regional actor was a sign of a turn in TFP under the Justice and 
Development Party’s (AKP) rule. The AKP being in the power since 2002 has produced 
probably one of the most debated and discussed contemporary foreign policies during the last 
more than a decade. This debate, or these debates – presented in a given chapter – preliminary 
rather focused on Ankara’s EU accession, later its stance towards its Western partners and its 
search for new allies. It is safe to say that the majority of scholars have chosen the Middle 
East as a case study to test and analyse Turkey’s foreign relations and their changing 
dynamics. The Arab Spring, and its tremendous effects in 2011 put Turkey, again in the 
centre of analysis and promoted it, again, to became a model for democratizing Arab 
countries. The ‘Turkish model,’ later Ankara’s growing difficulties in the Middle Eastern 
neighbours, especially the Syrian war has kept Turkey an important focal point of IR and FPA 
literature. However, Turkey’s growing leverage on its neighbours during the last 10-15 years 
also affected its relations with south-eastern European countries. 
News, articles, policy papers focusing on Turkey’s activism in the Balkans began to be 
frequently published / issued after the recently-nominated, new Foreign Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s visit in Sarajevo in fall 2009. At a conference organized in the Bosnian capital, 
he elaborated his ideas about Turkey’s historical mission in the Balkans and the need to 
reinstate good intraregional relations. His speech brought back Turkey to the spotlight (at 
least in the Balkans’ context) and gave an impetus to political analysts, researchers and 
journalists to work on Turkish foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe. Ankara’s successes in 
the region – as a facilitator of the rapprochement between Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, trade agreements, almost immediate recognition and support of Kosovo, 
spectacular expansion of Turkish organizations etc. – provided enough ground for 
speculations and researches about the features of Ankara’s ambitions in the region. The public 
interest increased even in Hungary, as the issue was presented in various articles and lectures. 
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It has become obvious that although the relations between Turkey and the Balkans1 
provide an excellent ground for a thesis presenting and discussing the history of Turkish 
foreign policy with a historian’s tools and point of view, it, however, could not be enough to 
explain the current relations adequately. History and the developments of bi- and multilateral 
relations, the notion of Balkans and Ottoman heritage occupy an important part of this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, simply revealing the various conflicts of the last century, 
immigration waves, wars and Turkey’s current activities in a linear manner would have 
narrowed the scope of the thesis and hide important social and political changes in the 
country’s recent history. Nonetheless, the author admits that more extended researches and 
prospective publications about the history of relations between the Balkans and Turkey would 
strengthen the Hungarian Balkanologie.  
These findings also pointed out the importance of two notions: power and dynamism. 
The preliminary assumption of the research – Turkey’s hegemony or dominance over various 
countries directly put power into the heart of this research project. Nevertheless, further 
fieldworks convinced the Author, that scope from predominantly inter-state relations should 
be switched to domestic level. Power that runs and shapes politics within a country shapes its 
foreign policy as well. In a country like Turkey, where power struggle was so apparent during 
the 20th century (relatively frequent coup d’états, regimes changes) and successive hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic project dominated the political landscape from the Young Turks to 
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan’s AKP. That is why the Author decided to highlight the changes of 
Turkish domestic political structure which influences the country’s foreign activism. This 
focal point – the nature of power in the domestic Turkish context – made it indispensable to 
turn towards a theory that has adequate explanatory force to understand the dynamics of 
internal factors and features of Turkish foreign policy. The dynamics also suggested orienting 
                                                 
1 The Author has to address the problem of definition of the ’Balkans.’ A number of approaches exist that 
defines the region geographically, politically and consequently gives different country groupings for it. 
According to some perceptions, even Turkey shall be considered as a Balkan country which also underlines the 
country’s relevance for the region (some five percent of Turkey, including the half of Istanbul and its 
metropolitan area is also located in the geographical Balkan area). Without presenting the literature about the 
possible definition of the region the Author defines the Balkans as a political-geographical area consisting of 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. 
The Author does not consider Greece to be part of this analytical country grouping. Its reason is twofold. Firstly, 
it is linked to the fact that during the Cold War, Greece’s history and development started to diverge from 
Socialist Balkan states (that now, after a long period of transition, intend to catch up to Athens). Secondly, 
Greek-Turkish relations are more intensive due to the permanent problems such as the dispute about the exact 
delimitation of the Aegean Sea border and more importantly, because of the Cyprus issue. The involvement of 
this issue would extend the limits of present thesis. Slovenia is not considered as a Balkan country, either. Due to 
its different history – it was a core part of Austria for centuries – and the lack of Ottoman conquest, it shall be 
put to other country group such as Central Europe.  
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towards a theoretical framework that can explain the causes of changes in Turkish foreign 
policy. 
The domestic changes affected the country’s foreign policy in a great manner. One of 
the main theoretical questions of the thesis is that how domestic political (power) 
transformation shapes a country’s foreign policy goals, tools and characteristics. The other 
one is related to how international world order influences the nature of the domestic power, 
and consequently the foreign policy.  
In this context this thesis intends to provide adequate answers to the question of 1) 
whether Gramsican and Neo-Gramscian theory can be as a theoretical framework in the 
analysing the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. This piece would make an attempt to 
elaborate 2) why and how Turkish foreign policy has changed during the AKP-era, especially 
after the nomination of Davutoğlu. The thesis 3) reflects to the current debate about Turkish 
foreign policy conflicts with its traditional Western allies and its reorientation towards its 
‘newly found’ neighbourhood. In this respect, this work 4) evaluates Ankara’s foreign policy 
as well. 
To answer these questions and achieve these goals, this dissertation is divided into 
three main parts. The first one portrays the methodology and hypotheses, elaborates the 
theoretical foundations and gives an overview about the debates on TFP. In the second main 
chapter, the Author presents the AKP’s political emergence and the internal power 
transformation that features the period between 2002 and 2018. Although the dissertation 
outlines the historical background of the political trajectory of Islamist parties, it rather 
focuses on this 16-year-long period which starts 3 November 2002 by the electoral victory of 
the AKP and lasts until the 24 June 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections which 
cemented the AKP’s power and introduced the presidential system in Turkey creating a 
cornerstone in the process of hegemony building. This chapter elaborates the features of the 
AKP’s hegemony in Turkey and its neo-Ottoman political cultural characteristics. This 
section also shows how neoliberal world order affected Turkey. The third part establishes the 
links between the party’s hegemony and its foreign policy towards the Balkans. This chapter 
explains why usually Muslim communities play a central role in Turkey’s ambitions and how 
Turkish decision-makers portray the Balkans. It analyses the activities of Turkish foreign 
policy institutions and the non-governmental actors’ role in representing Ankara’s interests. 
Furthermore, this chapter also address the economic relations between Balkan countries and 
Turkey. 
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By writing this thesis, the Author intended to contribute to development on Social 
Sciences. The following elements played the role in choosing the topic.  
 
1) Testing theory 
This thesis’s theoretical framework offers a unique case and approach to explain 
current political dynamics within Turkey and its foreign policy making, especially 
towards the Balkans. Gramsci’s political materialist theory about hegemony and the 
construction of hegemonic bloc is not unknown in the Hungarian and international 
literature, however, in Hungary its ‘application’ is very limited. There is no Hungarian 
translation of his famous Prisons notebooks; only some chapters or parts were 
published that is far inadequate to make extended research in Hungarian about his 
theory that explains why his idea had very limited effects on Hungarian researches. 
Nonetheless, his ideas have a valuable explanatory capability to reveal and understand 
AKP’s domestic politics in Turkey, and some dimensions of its foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, it is just one side of the coin. 
The ‘re-invention of Gramsci’ by American IR theorists helped to redefine its 
preliminary, rather society-oriented theory. Robert W. Cox has changed the previous 
scope by broadening to the global level. He and his followers offered a system-level 
analytical framework based on permanent change and movement refusing a static 
approach and admitting the relevance of dynamism. This theory explaining the world 
order by the US neoliberal hegemony that other states intend to adapt and realize their 
own (neoliberal) hegemonic projects creates a valuable opportunity to analyse Turkish 
foreign policy at system-level. By combining these two theories, it provides a case for 
expanding ‘usual’ theoretical frameworks. Finally, the poor representation of Neo-
Gramscian theory in Hungarian literature also legitimizes the Author’s choice that 
could contribute to broaden the tools for conceptualizing and understanding a given 
country’s foreign policy. 
 
2) Importance of Turkey 
Turkey as a middle-power has a particular role in current international relations. 
Possessing with a strategic location, it occupies the interception of three conflict zones 
that shapes contemporary international relations.  Nowadays, one of these regions 
seems to be rather peaceful – the Balkans where two bloody wars were taking place in 
the 1990’s. Other two regions, the Caucasus and the Middle East constitute a 
8 
 
troublesome neighbourhood for Turkey. Ankara’s involvement in the Syrian war also 
strengthened its leverage in the international field. As a host of more than 3 million 
refugees, it was a key actor in handling the 2015 refugee crisis that also affected 
Hungary. Turkey could give a fresh impetus to the EU accession negotiations 
benefitting from the crisis. 
Furthermore Ankara conducts a rather proactive foreign policy in order to influence of 
the outcome of current political processes at adjacent territories. Its position, its 
ambitions also increase the country’s importance within the international community: 
the AKP’s government growing activities passed the border of the neighbouring 
regions, and even its ‘traditional’ partners like the US, EU or Central Asia. Now, 
Ankara targets Africa, Latin-America and Far-East. During recent years, Turkish 
foreign policy tools were diversified; e. g. the Turkish Development Agency’s (TİKA) 
performance was rocketing. The foreign policy is just one field that makes Turkey an 
excellent field of research. The social and political transformation that occurs in the 
country throughout the Justice and Development Party rule is a particular phenomenon 
in the Muslim World. Probably Turkey is the Muslim state that made the most steps 
towards democracy even if this process does not avoid ambiguities and nowadays one 
can see more authoritarian tendencies in the country that advances to the presidential 
system. Despite the difficulties this feature offers a unique case to analyse this 
transformation effects on foreign policy pursuit.  
 
3) Balkans’ relevance for Hungary 
Choosing Turkey’s relations with the Balkans as a central problematique of the 
research was highly linked to Hungary. As a Hungarian researcher, the author wanted 
to focus on an issue which is not just geographically located close to Hungary but may 
concern his country’s public opinion, academic community and even decision-makers. 
Turkey’s current activities influence a region with which Hungary shares common 
history. Due to the geographical proximity, Hungary’s foreign policy based on its own 
strategic interests, meets the Turkish one and it may lead to cooperation or even 
competition. In order to understand Turkey’s growing ambitions in the region, it 
cannot be analysed without extensive research and understanding the internal 
processes and their effects on foreign policy making. Various centres focusing on the 
region, such as the valuable work of the Geographical Department of University of 
Pécs contributed to understand the internal demographic, economic and socio-political 
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development in the Balkans. The Author believes that putting the scope on Ankara in 
the regional context may also help to understand the internal tendencies. 
 
4) Following Orientalist tradition 
The other, Hungary-related aspect was the willingness to follow the Orientalist line in 
the country’s scientific history. Although the author considers himself as a political 
scientist, he intends to channel its research focus to the East. Started with 
ÁrminVámbéry, Ottoman Empire – as Turkey can be considered as its hereditary – 
was a key element for Hungarian orientalists in order to understand our history and 
culture. Furthermore, during communist era Hungarian Turkologists such as György 
Németh conducted their researches in Bulgaria’s Turkish inhabited regions. The 
political scientist approach used in the dissertation intends to broaden and in the same 
time to follow this Orientalist tradition. 
 
5) Author personal stance 
Closely linked to the above mentioned reasoning, the author personal interest also 
influenced why he has chosen this topic. A number of years ago, as simple university 
student he started to deal with Turkish minority living in the Balkans, and later he 
turned towards Turkey. Meanwhile, he preserved his interest towards Turkish minority 
groups and the Balkans as a whole which convinced him to bring together these topics 
in a dissertation. Due to his researches which were realized – alongside with long 
hours spent in various libraries and archives – as extended field researches in Balkans 
countries and in Turkey itself, the author  hopes that information and sources gathered 
by previous years may contribute to his deeper understanding of the region and 
Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. 
 
The thesis focuses on the AKP’s rise and the transformation of power at the domestic 
level that led to a significant change of Turkish foreign policy. This development paved the 
way for a new vision in cultural and identity policy and the change of traditional orientation 
and tools in foreign policy making. Thus, the central argumentation concerning the internal 
effects on Turkish foreign policy is based on the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: The emergence of AKP as an internal hegemon creates a Neo-Ottoman regime 
what shapes its foreign policy.  
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Neo-Ottomanism may be placed in the centre of contemporary Turkish cultural 
policies; however, it is just one side of the coin. The effects of internal changes on foreign 
policy are not independent from the changes in the international system. As the Author 
presented, a number of works argues that the adjustment in the global structure or regional 
sub-structure shaped Ankara’s international relations. He also argues that these developments 
also affected the Turkish society and domestic politics as well. The Author states that the 
main effects are linked to the neoliberal turn in economy, beginning by the Özal era in the 
mid-1980s and lasting nowadays. 
This neoliberal turn has transformed the society and strengthened the Central-
Anatolian business elites during the 1980s and 1990s as well as it contributed to the changes 
in the political landscape. The emergence of the Anatolian Tigers was a prelude of political 
adjustment; however, every Turkish government’s aim was to establish investment-friendly 
conditions in the country. Despite the gradual opening to international markets and accepting 
a rather export oriented trade policy, these years were troublesome for Turkish economy. 
Ankara had to face several crises in 1994, 1999, 2000 and 2001. The last one particularly 
damaged the reputation of the government parties and contributed in a great manner to the 
electoral victory of the AKP in 2002.  
Since this electoral victory, the Justice and Development Party has managed to keep 
the power and follow a neoliberal policy by opening its markets, affiliating with the EU, 
benefiting from FDI and the positive effects of growing trade. Various business associations 
also could take advantage from this neoliberal turn that the government also supported. Not 
surprisingly, the economy or economic interests also have appeared as important features of 
the AKP. 
The Author argues that the global structure’s most important effects on Turkey was 
the ‘victory’ of Neoliberalism that linked more the country to the international economy and 
contributed to the last decades’ political changes as well. Having a neoliberal party at power, 
representation of neoliberal economic values in foreign policy also gain momentum. The 
interconnection of the social changes as the effects of the global structure influences the 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, the thesis formulates the second 
hypothesis of the dissertation as: 
 
H2: The AKP's hegemony is a derivate of the neoliberal global structure that affects 
its foreign policy by the growing role of the economy. 
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The Author argues that although the need to tackle the growing global and regional 
challenges affects Turkish foreign policy, however, its embedment to the international system, 
and the international neoliberal system compelled the country to be active in its international 
relations. The emergence of pro-neoliberal classes in Turkey also affected its foreign policy as 
the economy has become more and more important in diplomatic relations. Consequently, the 
neoliberal world order pushed Ankara towards a more opened and active, trade- and 
investment-oriented foreign policy. 
 
2. Methodology  
The research is based on qualitative methodology and the extensive research of primary and 
secondary sources and their analyses by Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian theoretical 
framework. The time frame of the research limited the possible use of sources. As it focuses 
on the AKP’s period (more exactly from November 2002 to the implementation of the 
presidential system after June 2018), it could not use confidential documents, strategies but 
rely on contemporary, open sources.  
This it analyses the speeches and writings of Turkish decision-makers. Ahmet Davutoǧlu – 
who was probably the main actor in shaping Ankara's external relations during the given 
period – active publishing activities helped to outline the TFP. His academic background and 
writings, especially his famous volume Stratejik Derinlik paved the way to understand his 
view about the region as advisor, later on as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The speeches of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, as Prime Minister, later as President of the Republic also made a 
compelling contribution to the thesis. The discourse-analysis reveals the political elite's 
perception of the Balkans and the way how this image is constructed. Certainly, political 
statements shall be the object of deep analysis and shall be questioned as various intentions 
are in their background, however, the construction of an image and its use in public speeches 
emerges as an orientation point for the researcher. 
Turkish state institutions’ and civil organisations’ publications, statements and news also 
helped the research. Usually these online sources portrayed the scope and nature of the given 
organisation’s activities. Annual reports of the TİKA, the TDV were the most useful from this 
respect.  
Interrelated with the discourse analysis of political leaders’ oral or written statements and 
speeches, field researches in Turkey and in various Balkans countries also represent a 
valuable contribution to the work. Meetings and discussions with scholars, journalists, 
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representatives of the administration and politicians represented a useful experience for the 
work. Obviously the outcome of these meeting varies in a wide range, and invite to a severe 
analysis and criticism. Nevertheless, the acquired knowledge about the TFP cannot be 
neglected. These trips also facilitated to use primary and secondary sources written in Turkish 
language that would not have been possible to find in Hungary.  
Official statistical data provided by relevant statistical institutes and governmental institutions 
were also essential contributions. Statistical data show the change in economic relations, the 
effects of the various agreements in boosting trade and investment. These highlighted the 
importance of Balkans for Turkey, at least in economic terms.  
Although the thesis focuses on contemporary issues, it could not neglect the past which 
influences the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies greatly. Thus, history books helped to 
describe the importance of the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman heritage for the current political 
situation and narratives.  Books and articles dealing with the Turkey’s history in the 20th 
century also contributed to the better understanding of the AKP’s hegemony project. 
Secondary sources were crucial in defining the hypotheses, outlining the research questions 
and understanding the debate(s) about TFP in the literature review. Furthermore, they also 
contributed to mapping the TFP’s institutional background. 
 
1)  books  
2) journal papers 
3) political analyses 
4) newspaper articles 
 
The qualitative analysis of a number of primary and secondary sources hopefully may provide 
adequate tools to justify H1 and H2. The timeframe of the research covers six AKP 
governments that may provide enough samples for the dissertation. During these six 
governments the conduct of Turkish foreign policy has changed simultaneously with the 
emergence of AKP as a hegemon in Turkey. This change also affected Turkey's relations with 
Balkan states, as Turkish presence has become more visible and the international scientific 
community also started to focus on Turkish activities. During the last fifteen years, Ankara’s 
diplomacy has produced a great number of events, programmes and foreign policy tools to 
possess a relatively big sample to analyse. 
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3. Research findings 
This piece intended to reveal the internal dynamics of Turkish domestic politics by 
utilising Antonio Gramsci’s theoretical framework about hegemony, reflecting on the neo-
Gramscianist writings on neo-liberal hegemony and analysing these dynamics’ effects on 
Turkey’s foreign policy in the Balkans. It argued that the AKP under the leadership of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was successful in becoming a counter-hegemonic actor based on 
the rising Islamist classes and capital. While it accommodated the neo-liberal economic 
policy and embedded Turkey into the neo-liberal, globalising world order, it gained 
enough social legitimacy and power to counter the traditional veto players such as the 
military and top courts, which served as the last bastions of Kemalist elites. Later, the 
AKP also defeated the opponents within the Islamist field, most prominently the Gülenist 
movement and weakened the position of Islamist and nationalist parties (such as the 
Saadet Partisi, MHP or İYİ) by absorbing the majority of Islamist and conservative voters 
into its hegemonic bloc. 
The AKP was successful in creating its own electoral hegemony. This was based on 
several factors, such as a perpetual ability to manage political crises and to set the national 
agenda. It also could benefit from steady economic development and stable growth, 
especially in the first years of power (until 2007). Later, Turkish economic performance 
remained sustainable despite internal difficulties (e.g. the decline in of tourism, the 
devaluation of YTL, the deteriorating business climate, etc.), which did not harm its 
popularity to a great degree. The government’s large-scale infrastructure, education and 
healthcare programmes also convinced the deprived social classes that the only viable 
option for them was to keep the AKP in power.  
After the emergence of the AKP as a governmental party in 2002, scholars did not predict 
a long future based on the party’s Islamic roots and the fate of its predecessors – banned 
regularly by the Constitutional Court and removed from power by the army. Although the 
AKP established a remarkably strong presence in the parliament, with only one opposition 
party (the Republican People’s Party, or CHP), the Kemalist elite and especially the TSK 
were deeply suspicious of the party’s rhetoric, along with its domestic and foreign policy 
endeavours. Past experiences of the shutting down of former Islamist parties oriented the 
AKP leadership to use a more pro-European discourse and follow an EU-compliant 
policy-making strategy. Accompanied by remarkable economic growth, this policy 
ensured electoral victory in the following elections. Steady economic growth stabilised the 
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party’s position at home, which was rewarded by the start of EU accession negotiations in 
2005.  
After tackling the threat imposed by the Kemalist establishment – namely the e-
memorandum in April 2007 and the so-called ‘constitutional coup’ attempt by the chief 
prosecutor and Constitutional Court in 2008 – the AKP continued to increase its influence. 
This process was – at least indirectly – helped by various investigations and probes, like 
the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. These contributed to weakening the opposition forces, as 
(retired) generals, university presidents, leftist politicians, intellectuals and journalists 
were detained and later sentenced to prison. These affairs silenced many of the critics of 
the government. Moreover, they also influenced the relations between the AKP and the 
army by easing the transformation of the latter’s leadership. The next wave of internal 
fights started at the end of 2013: probes were launched by the judiciary, however this time 
they aimed at targeting pro-government circles and this step led to a government crisis. 
This attempt was reframed as a coup attempt by the so-called ‘parallel state’ – the 
Gülenist movement – and was dealt with through the mass dismissal of suspected 
Gülenists from state institutions and an open ‘war’ against the movement. This internal 
struggle culminated in the 15th July coup attempt associated with the movement, which 
ultimately failed and paved the way towards even harsher retaliations and the almost 
complete annihilation of the movement.  
The 2010 constitutional referendum also enhanced the growth of AKP’s power as it made 
it more difficult to ban political parties and changed the Constitutional Court’s statute. 
The general elections in June 2011 granted the highest share of votes in the party’s 
history, nearly 50 percent. Although the second half of the third Erdoğan government’s 
term resulted in unprecedented social unrest and corruption scandals, the AKP managed to 
overcome these challenges and even won the local elections in March 2014. This era 
culminated in Erdoğan’s victory at the presidential elections in August 2014. He could 
save its position after the 2015 June elections when the AKP could not seize the simple 
majority. The snap elections in November secured the party a comfortable majority in the 
TBMM but the Turkish ‘war on terror’ launched in July 2015 led to the gradual 
destabilisation of the country, growing insecurity, perpetual attacks by PKK/TAK, ISIS 
and other terrorist groups. Although the coup attempt in 2016 did not achieve its goal; the 
increasing authoritarian tendencies, spreading violence and the gradual crackdown on 
Kurdish political movements with the constitutional change opened a new chapter in the 
modern history of Turkey. 
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The AKP was able to win consecutive elections since 2002 which is a unique case for the 
establishment of the Turkish multi-party system in 1950. There was no other party or 
leader that could stay in power for more than fifteen years and survived a great number of 
‘coup attempts’ from the judiciary to the military ones, as well as defeat various internal 
adversaries, like the Fethullah Gülen movement. The party’s electoral success played a 
key role in maintaining its hegemonic position. It helped the AKP to acquire the majority 
in the parliament, to gain almost two-thirds of the municipalities and acquire the 
presidential post after 2007 (firstly for Abdullah Gül in 2007, later for Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan in 2014). Thus, the electoral victories based on 35-50 percent of votes provided 
the opportunity to boost its popularity among vast parts of the society, to seize key 
institutions and control over the state apparatus, create economic and media dominance; in 
summary, to create a hegemonic bloc. 
Its hegemonic project based on Islamist circles combined with neo-liberal economic 
policies was successful. The emergence of the Islamist middle classes can be described as 
a slow process of war, a passive revolution of a counter-hegemonic force that intended to 
occupy the hegemonic position of the Kemalist elite. This process could not avoid the 
perennial coercive forces of the state as Islamist parties (along with others) were regularly 
marginalised since the 1970s. Nonetheless, the AKP as a depositary of pro-market 
economy, religious, conservative groups won the elections in 2002, which opened a way a 
gradual change without violent events – e.g. without a war of manoeuvre – that finally 
resulted in the establishment of cultural hegemony. This can be characterised as neo-
Ottomanism due to the use of religion and the Ottoman legacy in the field of cultural 
policy. Nevertheless, the AKP’s hegemonic project cannot be declared as a finished one in 
Turkey. The ambiguities of its hegemonic project are represented by the struggle between 
the AKP and the existing – but obviously declining – Kemalist elites, leftist groups, and 
Gülenists. The clashes over power in recent years led to the increasing authoritarianism in 
Turkish domestic politics characterised by one politician’s growing power. This politician, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan has managed to transform the country’s political system from a 
parliamentary to a presidential one and to centralise the state in an increasingly 
authoritarian way. 
The author described the neo-Ottomanist characteristics of the AKP’s cultural policy 
focusing on the mighty imperial past with strong religions connotations and a type of 
‘Kulturkampf’ (cultural war) against the Kemalist heritage. Contrary to the common 
belief, the AKP’s foreign policy was less neo-Ottomanist (in terms of irredentism, 
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revisionism towards former imperial lands and aggressive spread of Islam) because its 
turn towards its ‘near abroad’ (essentially the post-Ottoman territories) stemmed from the 
neo-liberal turn in the Turkish economy and the need for a more autonomous foreign 
policy in an more and more insecure, multipolar world. The AKP’s pro-active foreign 
policy advocated globalisation, economic opening and boosted the image of the country 
and the self-confidence of an emerging global player. Turkey joined the G20 in 2002, was 
able to start the European Union accession negotiations in 2005, whereas it launched a 
new initiative with Spain called the Alliance of Civilisations promoting intercultural 
(inter-civilisational) dialogue. In the same year, it was elected to the UN Security Council 
as a temporary member for 2009-2011, it also managed to position itself as one of the 
main depositaries of human rights for a while and one of the leaders of the Muslim 
countries, and via a fast-growing net of institutions, such as the TİKA, YTB and the 
Yunus Emre Institutes emerged as an important actor not just in the former Ottoman 
territories but in the entire Muslim world. 
The government was ready to use foreign policy as a tool for its election purposes. At the 
beginning of the AKP’s era, EU accession was a major goal, thus seeking good relations 
with EU members states appeared on the party’s agenda. After 2006, when the accession 
negotiations lost their momentum due to the dead-end of the Cyprus issue, the AKP 
gradually withdrew from emphasising the EU’s role, or even started to use a more critical 
approach stating that the ‘Christian bloc’ has been using double standards and had an anti-
Turkey or anti-Islam stance. The 2009 municipal election campaign coincided with the 
Davos crisis and the deterioration of Israeli diplomatic relations, which boosted the 
support of Erdoǧan within Turkey and in the Arab world as well. The Mavi Marmara 
flotilla issue was also used by the AKP to strengthen its popularity by benefiting from 
anti-Israeli sentiments before the 2011 elections.  
Recently, the 2017 referendum also showed the readiness to sacrifice diplomatic relations 
for domestic gains: the Turkish government weathered the conflict with the Netherlands 
by insisting on pursuing rallies on its territory despite the prohibition of the Hague. The 
AKP implemented sanctions and used belligerent rhetoric against the Netherlands after 
Dutch authorities prevented its ministers Mevlüt Çavușoǧlu and Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya 
from speaking at rallies of the Turkish diaspora. 
The foreign policy discourse, especially under Ahmet Davutoğlu, highly reflected on the 
Ottoman past, values and glory that could be of use for domestic political purposes. 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Balkans also gained a new context: the good relations 
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with this region, especially the close cooperation with the Muslims granted the AKP more 
popularity in the religious electorate and was also convincing at least in a limited manner 
for the voters who had any Balkan affiliation. This Ottoman cause received strong 
incentives from Bosnia, which was easy to interlink with the role of Islam. As the 
Yugoslav wars revitalised the discourse about identity and Islam not just in the Balkans 
but in the whole world, Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist party, the Refah’s politicians and 
charity organisations, such as the İHH, closely followed the developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and intended to send aid (which however resulted in a corruption scandal). 
The Bosniaks were described as Muslim people of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The 
writings and ideas of the Bosniak leader, Aliya Izetbegović gained momentum in Turkey 
even during the AKP’s era, and soon became a reference point (e.g. new publishing of his 
writings, or Erdoğan’s good personal relations with his son, Bakir Izetbegović). 
Furthermore, the genocide of Srebrenica appeared in Turkish politics and media. 
Srebrenica has become a lieu de mémoire for pious Turkish Muslims, and 
commemorations are held for every anniversary not just in the Balkans but in Turkey as 
well. 
The Balkans retain a unique place in the neo-Ottoman discourse. As İlber Ortaylı pointed 
out, the Ottoman Empire was also a Balkan Empire and the Ottoman rule had greater 
effects on the region compared to that on the Middle East; subsequently, one could argue 
that the Balkans had a greater reverse impact on the Ottoman Empire and later on the 
history of Turkey. The more Ottomanness is linked to multiculturalism and religion, the 
more the Muslim people of the Balkans gain ground in the AKP’s Ottomanism. Moreover, 
several centuries of Ottoman rule (approximately 550 years in Macedonia, 500 years in 
Bulgaria, some 400 years in Serbia and Bosnia) produced an immense ‘constructed 
heritage’ in the form of bridges, caravanserais, mosques, hamams, etc., which are specific 
mementos of Turkey and its cultural impact. 
From this respect, Balkans is more important for Turkey than Turkey is for the Balkans. It 
has no real hard power leverage, especially after the 2016 coup attempt when the Turkish 
military was decimated and almost half of the admiralty and brigadier levels were 
dismissed or detained. Despite sending its troops, Turkey’s military presence in a rather 
stable region (compared to the 1990s and early 2000s) can be identified as a soft power 
tool to demonstrate its commitment towards ‘its brethren’ and assure the Turkish 
electorate about the country’s allegiance to its kin. Even if Turkey makes gains against the 
PKK in southeast Turkey and against the PYD in Afrin or northern Syria, the above-
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mentioned internal purges and lack of (experienced) commanders weaken the image and 
the real capabilities of the (omni)potent TSK.  
The AKP’s goal of ensuring good economic relations and boosting trade and investment 
also delineates the limits of Turkish foreign policy. Economic interests have a great 
leverage on Ankara’s approach to the Balkans. The success of these policies are linked to 
the growing statistical figures (e.g. volume and value of trade, investments, number of 
companies), but one can conclude that neither the Balkans plays a crucial role for Turkey 
nor is Turkey a major economic actor for the region after analysing the data. Only 5-6 
percent of Turkish trade goes to the Balkans (the Western Balkans’ share is even less) and 
it has been declining during the AKP’s era, highlighting that the economic importance of 
the Balkans does not grow as fast as Turkey’s economic relations with other regions and 
countries. If one looks at the other side, similar patterns can be outlined. The share of 
Turkey’s export and import for Balkan countries is also small, in every case it is less than 
10 percent, and with the exception of some countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Albania, it is decreasing.  
The internal problems and features of the region and Turkey itself explain these dynamics. 
First of all, the Balkan region is so fragmented and divided among small states that it is 
more vulnerable to external political powers but less attractive for external investors. 
Their internal troubles, corruption (their weak performance in competitive indexes has 
already been shown) and market size are the main factors that makes Turkish companies’ 
activities more limited.  
Furthermore, Turkey’s economic performance also has its own limits and affects its 
relations with the region. The years after 2013/2015 have seen more and more economic 
challenges for Turkey, like the devaluation of the Turkish lira despite the yearly 4-5% 
GDP growth led by the construction sector. The economic struggles of the country also 
reduce its potential for investments and trade with southeast Europe. 
Turkish activism in the Balkans, even after Davutoǧlu fell from power, is an outcome of 
the internal economic, social and political changes of the country. Turkey’s main activities 
in the region did not change after May 2016, the same institutions continue their tasks in 
roughly the same manner. Bosnia and Herzegovina and other Balkan countries, like 
Macedonia or Kosovo, play an important role in Turkish domestic politics and for the 
AKP’s decision makers, especially Erdoǧan. Srebrenica has been used as a tool for 
mobilising the more religious electorate and it is also a tool in order to build the feeling of 
collective belonging among various Muslim communities.   
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But the power projection of Turkey to Muslim communities has its own limits as well. 
There is a strong difference between the Balkan countries in this respect. In the Western 
Balkans, while the Diyanet supports its kin these Muslim communities rather look up to 
their states and align themselves rather with their respective capitals than with Ankara. In 
these countries Turkey appears as a strong supporter of religious communities by 
providing publishing (translation), aid packages for religious events, exchange for 
students, religious personnel and financial help via various ways, especially constructing 
or renovating mosques. The interference in these communities’ internal affairs has 
remained limited, and the mediation between conflicting factions of these communities 
did not reach a breakthrough (see the case of Serbia). The co-optation to the AKP’s 
hegemonic bloc was strengthened by establishing close links between various 
congregations in the Balkan countries and Turkey. These inter-community relations were 
boosted by the Diyanet local muftis and the Turkish towns as well. By building these 
bridges, the commitment of Turkey has become more tangible and noticeable. However, 
the Diyanet’s moves are under suspicion, even if the support is welcomed. There is a 
strong difference between the Muslim communities in the Balkans and Turkey: in the 
Balkan countries, they are autonomous, the state does not interfere in their affairs (or does 
not intends to interfere), which in turn has led more internal conflicts between their 
leaderships, while on the other side the Bosporus the Diyanet works as a state institution 
with an appointed (and not an elected) leader, meaning its activities are part of state 
policy.  
Bulgaria and Romania constitute a different group compared to the Western Balkans. The 
majority of their Muslims are Turks. These countries allowed Turkey during the 1990s to 
act as a kin state in the field of religion. Thus Ankara managed to gain a strong 
institutional leverage, especially in education because the imam-hatip schools are run by 
the Diyanet. Furthermore, imams sent from Turkey are also present. The Diyanet 
mediation in the case of the conflict over the leadership of Chief Muftiate was also 
handled with its help. 
From this perspective, Albania is a special case. After many decades of strong anti-
religious policies, the country in the early 1990s welcomed the support of various Muslim 
countries and faith-based religious networks. Turkey, and more importantly the Gülenist 
movement, were successful in gaining ground in this context and emerged as a partner in 
(re)building the Islamic education system. It has become not the only one, but one the 
most important actors in this field. 
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The co-option of these Muslim communities into the Turkish state is happening via 
governmental and non-governmental actors. The above-mentioned state organs, like the 
Diyanet, the TİKA development agency, the Maarif Vakfı and so on follow the same logic 
in creating leverage and supporting the Ottoman-constructed legacy and Muslim 
communities. Non-governmental actors also participated in these endeavours. The various 
Balkan immigrant communities participate rather indirectly in foreign policy making 
because of their influence for the higher ranks is rather negligible. However, via twin 
town programmes, through electoral tourism and participation as well as political 
campaigns and protests they are able to influence the public opinion and gain leverage 
over the electoral performance of the Turkish parties, especially in Bulgaria where the 
Turkish minority live in greater number.  
The various Islamist charity organisations and faith-based networks are more tangibly 
linked to the state’s endeavours. There projects are often realised in close cooperation 
with Turkish state institutions (TİKA, Diyanet) and through twin town projects. Faith-
based Islamic networks also contributed to the strengthening of Islam education in these 
countries in line with the principles of Hanafi Islam that the Diyanet supports.  
Turkey did not generally change its foreign policy towards the Balkans during the AKP 
era compared to the 1990s. It follows the main principles of seeking security and 
promoting ‘Ottoman Islam’ alongside upholding every aspect of the Ottoman heritage. 
This in practice entails the support of ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ Islam, which is different from 
the new Wahabbi influences of the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, Turkey emerged as a historical 
partner for these communities, even if there are strong domestic political considerations 
behind Ankara’s aid. Nevertheless, despite the growing Turkish institutional network, the 
vast amount of invested money in building soft power capabilities, Ankara has acquired a 
limited number of local allies, even if these countries’ governments usually seek to 
establish good political and economic relations with their emerging middle power 
neighbour.  
Good relations with the Islamic communities’ leaders, the Turkish political parties (except 
the MRF) and Izetbegović’s SDA and some intellectual circles represent the main 
strongholds of the AKP in the Balkans, which can be used for domestic occasions as well. 
Nonetheless, the Turkish leadership’s gains in secular countries and mainly secular 
communities has marked limits (the best example of which is the antipathy towards the 
AKP among Bulgarian Turks), even if it behaves as a kin state for the religious Muslims. 
Thus Turkey has remained a strong centre of gravity for the religious institutions. 
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This focus on Ottoman heritage and Islam in foreign relations can cause dissent among the 
Christian population. Due to the different nation-building processes, the perceptions about 
the shared history may be the opposite for these communities, thus they do not see 
Turkish endeavours in too positive a light. This is especially true in Bosnia, where the 
Republika Srpska’s political leadership is more sensitive to Ankara’s pro-Bosniak stance. 
The pro-Muslim discourse of Turkish politicians has led to diplomatic conflicts with 
Serbia or Bosnia (Serbian part) on several occasions; Turkey sometimes behaves like an 
elephant in a china shop by not paying enough attention to this sensitivity. While the 
current hegemonic bloc relies strongly upon this discourse for domestic reasons, it is fair 
to say that there will be no change in the prospective future and the probability of 
diplomatic crises will remain high.  
The Balkan countries have also felt the spill-over effect of the internal troubles of Turkey 
and are involved in the fight over domestic hegemony. The government pushes toward 
weakening or closing down Gülenist institutions and networks abroad. This war presented 
a dilemma for these states in the Balkans. Despite some people’s extradition the 
movement’s organisations have remained intact for the most part. This also suggests that 
Ankara may not be the main reference point for the countries of the region. 
Turkey has two main incentives to increase its leverage on the region. First, the AKP 
pushed towards  co-opting its kin through neo-Ottoman cultural policy: emphasising the 
shared heritage, Ottoman legacy, importance of (Hanafi) Islam, etc. But only limited 
segments of the population were supportive, namely some parts of the religious circles 
and the Turkish minority groups. Second, Turkey’s economic expansion based on the 
success of the AKP’s neo-liberal policies was successful in many ways. Nevertheless, its 
importance in the Balkans has remained limited compared to major EU powers, like 
Germany and Italy, but even Austria and Hungary (in some cases). Furthermore, its 
economic difficulties weaken its opportunity to become a more pivotal economic actor in 
the Balkans.  
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4. Conclusion 
 Conceptualising the scientific literature about Turkish foreign policy and 
identifying the main driving trends. 
 Using a Gramscian and neo-Gramscian approach for Turkey and its foreign policy 
in a detailed and comprehensive manner. 
 Describing the neo-Ottomanist cultural policy as a tool of hegemony making in 
Turkey.  
 Explaining the importance of various Muslim peoples (especially the Bosniaks) in 
(daily) Turkish domestic politics instead of national minority groups (Turks in 
Bulgaria) by identifying the change in the kin policy of Turkey. 
 Elaborating and updating the body of knowledge about the relevant Turkish 
foreign policy institutions. 
 Analysing Ankara’s foreign policy in a given region –  in the Balkans, and not just 
in the Western Balkans  – chosen as a case study and identifying its main tenets; 
by doing so, describing the Turkish economic (foreign trade) institutions and 
Ankara’s incentives to strengthen its neo-liberal economic transformation. 
 Revealing the main features of economic relations and outlining the importance of 
the region in economic terms to Turkey and vice versa, by claiming that despite 
the strong political emphasis Turkish capital has remained rather reluctant to enter 
the region. 
 Highlighting how Albania and Kosovo are the most dependent on Turkish 
economic relations in the Balkans, and this economic dependence has some chance 
of being converted into certain political advantages. 
 Identifying the importance of non-state groups in shaping Turkish foreign policy 
and perceptions, like the immigrant groups and associations in Turkey and their 
leverage, including the faith-based organisations (especially Gülenists) and charity 
organisations in the region. 
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